This paper discusses macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission in the 1960s. The Commission, in its analysis, focussed strongly on economic imbalances in the Community, as they could threaten the common market project. In order to strengthen the system of economic governance of the Community, the Commission advocated an improved monetary cooperation, in line with the internal logic of the integration process. This contrasted with the view of the central bankers, who took the international monetary system as the framework for their analysis.
INTRODUCTION
As observed by Tinbergen (1954) , economic integration concerns the regulation of international relations. As such, it is in essence a question of the organisation of economic policy, a highly political issue. It is noteworthy that, in the mid 1950s, the six "Schuman" countries that created the European Coal and Steel Community, followed two rather different paths to economic integration. The six countries opted for regional integration of the goods markets, with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, monetary integration was approached from a more world-wide perspective, with the restoration of complete external convertibility in the framework of the Bretton Woods system (Abraham & Lemineur-Toumson, 1981) . These approaches would largely determine how the Commission and the central bank governors of the Community viewed monetary issues. For the Commission, monetary integration was linked with the integration of the goods markets, where agriculture would occupy a special place. This contrasted with the perspective of the central bankers of the Community, for whom currency issues were, in the first instance, an issue related to the international monetary system.
In this paper the focus is on macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European 5.
MMTEC60art.doc competition on equal terms. It was therefore in favour of harmonisation of legislation which affected the competitive position, especially social legislation.
The EEC Treaty was, de facto, of a constitutional order and would transform economic and legal rules in the countries of the Community (Padoa-Schioppa, 1998, p. 9) . Looking at the Rome Treaties from an economic thought perspective, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) bears a French (planning) imprint, with its sectoral approach, while the European Economic Community, with the abolition of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital in the common market and strong emphasis on competition policy, shows a stronger German influence The part of the Treaty on "Economic Policy" comprised three chapters: "Conjunctural Policy", "Balance of Payments" and "Commercial Policy". The integration project goes farthest in the area of commercial policy, where, after the transitional period, "a uniform commercial policy" is foreseen (Article 111) 2 .
The chapter on "Conjunctural Policy" is rather short (only one article). It stipulated that macroeconomic policy, while being a matter of common concern, remained a responsibility of the Member States.
Article 103.1 said that "Member States shall regard their conjunctural policies as a matter of common concern. They shall consult each other and the Commission on the measures to be taken in the light of the prevailing circumstances". The procedures to be followed were indicated in Article 103.2, which stated that: "the Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, decide upon 1 Free movement of capital was more limited, in response to French pressure. Moreover, France also obtained the "safeguard clauses" (cf.infra).
2
As the references are to the original EEC Treaty, the original numbering of the articles is followed. the measures appropriate to the situation". In 1960, after a German initiative, the "Short-term Economic Policy Committee" was created on the basis of Article 103.
The most extensive discussion of macroeconomic and monetary issues can be found in the chapter "Balance of Payments". It further illustrates that macroeconomic and monetary issues were tackled from a "common market" perspective, as balance of payments disequilibria would threaten the creation and functioning of the common market. Also in this area, the German and French negotiators followed different approaches, partly due to differences in the economic situation in their countries.
Article 104 states that each Member State should pursue an economic policy "to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency, while taking care to ensure a high level of employment and a stable level of prices". Otmar Emminger (Deutsche Bundesbank) considered this a "fundamental" article as it implied the commitment of every Member State to adopt economic policies which would ensure balance of payments equilibrium (Emminger, 1958, p. 93) .
Article 105 continues that, in order to attain the objectives of Article 104, "Member States shall coordinate their economic policies". It states that the Member States "shall for this purpose institute a collaboration between the competent services of their departments and between their central banks". Already in January 1958, the Governors of the central banks decided to organise this cooperation, informally in Basle, and informed the Commission of this. It was a pre-emptive action by the Governors, who where afraid of a potential Commission initiative which might institute more tight rules (Pluym and Boehme, 2004, p. 117) .
Article 108 discusses the situation where a Member State has serious balance of payments difficulties which could threaten the functioning of the common market. It stipulates that the Commission should investigate the situation and that the Commission can recommend measures for the Member State to take. Moreover, the article provides for the possibility of granting "mutual assistance". Article 109 contains the famous safeguard clauses, which France insisted on, whereby, in the case of a sudden balance of payments crisis, a Member State can take the "necessary protective measures". The Treaty, in Article 105.2, also provided for the establishment of the Monetary Committee. It was based on a French Memorandum (Archives NBB, B 436/4). The Memorandum noted that in the monetary area, which remained a matter of national sovereignty, efficient cooperation was necessary for the functioning of the common market. The proposed missions of the Monetary Committee were to provide reciprocal information for the various authorities and to formulate opinions on "all aspects of monetary policy concerning the functioning of the common market". The Memorandum explicitly mentioned the mutual assistance procedure.
During the negotiations, the exchange rate issue was also a topic of serious discussions. According to Van Tichelen (1981, p. 340) , one of the Belgian negotiators, one of the main points of disagreement was whether it should be a national or a Community competence. The Belgian delegation, inspired by a Commonwealth formula, proposed that "Each Member State shall treat its policy with regard to rates of exchange as a matter of common concern" (Article 107.1). It was an ambiguous formula, but it succeeded in placing the exchange rate in the area of competence of the Community.
SENIOR MACROECONOMIC POLICY-MAKERS AT THE COMMISSION
It is the College of the Commission which is ultimately responsible for policy-making at the European In the EEC terminology, the term "Commission" is used both for the College of the Commission, the body of commissioners, and for the Commission departments, the administration. Marjolin is considered as one of the few prominent "Keynesian" economists in France, developing in his doctoral dissertation a long-run dynamic theory (Arena and Schmidt, 1999, p. 93 According to an interviewee, Monnet and Marjolin did not really grasp the idea of the market. For them, economics was a question of "steering from above".
5 Barre (2000, p. 19) mentions that it was in Brussels that he got to know the differences between the approaches of the French administration ("a keen sense of interventionism, supported by a certain lack of understanding of the market" and "formally or informally protectionist") and the German approach.
abolition of tariffs and quotas, as required by the Rome Treaty.
At the level of the administration, the Directors-General of DGII have traditionally been Italians. The first one, Franco Bobba, was a former diplomat. He was succeeded by Ugo Mosca, also a diplomat.
Both Bobba and Mosca had a reputation for being good organisers and negotiators, but less for providing analytical stimulation to the DG (where Marjolin and Barre played a key role).
Initially, DGII consisted of three directorates, reflecting the main preoccupations of macroeconomic policy-makers at the Commission. A first directorate, "National economies and business cycle", was The focus of this paper is on macroeconomic and monetary issues. For a discussion of the issue of the liberalisation of capital movements, see Bakker, 1996. 7 At the start of the Communities, the economic situation in France and the threat of French use of the safeguard clauses were major causes of concern. One can observe that many of the crucial positions for the assessment of the (French) situation were occupied by French persons. The economic situation would be discussed in the Monetary Committee, of which Prate was the Secretary. The report would be submitted by the Directorate of National Economies and Business Cycles (Millet) of DG II, for which Marjolin was responsible. Moreover, the Director-General for the Internal Market was Ortoli. 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1960S
As discussed earlier, in the EEC Treaty macroeconomic and monetary issues were approached very much from a balance of payments perspective, as balance of payments problems could threaten the common market project. It is thus important to analyse the economic shocks which affected the European Community, and, especially, the balance of payments.
The balance of payments can be affected by "asymmetric shocks" hitting a Community country. The two most important asymmetric shocks occurred in France, in the late 1950s and in 1968. France in the late 1950s was living through the final years of the Fourth Republic. The political uncertainty and the war in Algeria contributed to a volatile economic situation. In these circumstances, monetary and fiscal policy were lax. In 1958 inflation exceeded 10% and the balance of payments showed a deficit (cf. Figure 1 ). This was a serious problem for pro-Europeans in France: how could France participate in the common market project with this kind of macroeconomic imbalances? It was also a major concern for the Commission, as senior French officials were thinking of using the safeguard clauses (Jeanneney, 2004 Barre was one of the persons who played a key role in convincing De Gaulle that it was possible to avoid a devaluation.
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As far as the external environment was concerned, for most of the 1960s the Bretton Woods system provided the European Economic Community with a favourable international monetary environment.
Stable exchange rates, both between the countries of the European Community and with other countries, facilitated the integration process. However, academic discussions about the future of the international monetary system had already started, with Friedman's influential argument in favour of flexible exchange rates and Triffin's analysis of the flaws of the Bretton Woods System.
The United States took a central place in the Bretton Woods system. During most of the 1960s, especially the second half, the United States pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies (De Grauwe, 1989) . Keynesian ideas, namely that the government had a responsibility for full employment, and the Vietnam war played a role in this. These expansionary polices led to an accelerating inflation and a steady deterioration of the United States balance of payments (cf. Figure 1) . Consequently, the dollar was increasingly felt to be overvalued. Also, as the other countries had to maintain a fixed exchange rate with the dollar, they were forced to import inflation. It constituted an "external shock" for the European Community. In March 1961, Germany and the Netherlands had already revalued their currencies, given their sizeable external surpluses. It was an early indication of the flaws of the Bretton Woods system. It also gave an indication to the countries of the European Community that the demise of the Bretton Woods system could cause problems for the common market project. However, it was at the end of the 1960s that the real drama of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system unfolded.
Moreover, with the events of May 1968 in France, the French balance of payments also deteriorated.
The main counterpart of the American and French balance of payments deficits could be found in
Germany. The huge German balance of payments surplus put serious pressure on German policymakers who saw their objective of price stability threatened (Emminger, 1977) . In October 1969, the German authorities decided to revalue the German mark, after letting it float for a month. The Bretton Woods system went into its final phase. In May 1971 several currencies started floating. In August 1971 Nixon decided to "suspend" the gold convertibility of the US dollar.
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MMTEC60art.doc Marjolin started from the observation that the EEC Treaty provided for the basic principles of the coordination of economic policies, but that the details of this coordination had not been properly worked out. So, to achieve the ambitions of the Treaty, some of its provisions needed to be supplemented and made more explicit. Marjolin further argued for a common economic policy. This would provide a way of avoiding substantial divergences in inflation and employment, which would lead to balance of payments difficulties and the application of the safeguard clauses.
THE "EUROPEAN RESERVE FUND" PROJECT
To put into practice the coordination of policies, Marjolin proposed to undertake regular surveys of the economies of the Member States, in which the main economic and financial policy issues would be discussed. Moreover, he proposed that the Community institutions could also formulate policy This idea, that the Community should dispose of resources to facilitate financial solidarity, would become a recurring theme in Commission proposals (see also the Barre Memorandum). A basic principle behind it was that such mechanisms, by demonstrating a collective stance, were a more efficient way of averting currency speculation than isolated national measures. Also, it made it possible to offer "carrots" to countries which had to adjust policies, increasing so the influence of the 
THE COMMISSION'S ACTION PROGRAMME OF OCTOBER 1962
The first years of the EEC went well. And so, in October 1962, the Commission submitted a Memorandum with its Action Programme for the second stage of the Community (1962 Community ( -1965 . Walter
Hallstein, the president of the Commission, drafted the political introduction, while all Commission members took part in the preparation of the programme. In the Memorandum the Commission pushed for the Rome Treaty to be interpreted in the maximum sense as implying the progressive realisation of full economic and monetary union and political union.
The introduction of the Memorandum very strongly emphasised the political character of European economic integration, which was intended to lead to the economies of the six Member States merging in a full economic union
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. Economic union implied the progressive merger of national economic policies in a common short-term and long-term economic policy. This further implied that the Community would fix long-term economic objectives.
The chapter on competition policy (the area covered by von der Groeben) clearly reflected German ordo-liberal ideas. It emphasised that competition was essential for the orientation of economic activity. Moreover, it went further, linking the economic and political regime: "The economic order must also guarantee the attainment of the maximum degree of personal freedom for all those taking part in economic and social life." (Commission, 1962, p. 24 ).
In the chapter on economic policy (Marjolin's area), there was not only a plea for "a Community policy towards the business cycle" (p. 72), but also for a medium-term policy, "programming", at the level of the Community (p. 74). Several arguments were advanced for such "programming" at the Community level: to shed light on national and Community decisions, the effect of which is only discernible after a certain time lag; an indispensable instrument for a rational redistribution of the limited financial 16.
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; a framework for Community policies for agriculture, transport and energy; to support structural adjustments, especially regional development and industrial restructuring; to support an incomes policy. The Memorandum argued that programming would not go against competition policy, but would rather reinforce competition in the Community. The Memorandum proposed that a "consolidated programme" be established for the period 1964-1968. This programme would not only define the main macroeconomic aggregates, but also the expected or desired distribution of production between the main sectors of activity. The Commission organised a conference in Rome in November 1962 to discuss these ideas (Marjolin, 1963) .
In the chapter on monetary policy, another of Marjolin's areas, it was argued that monetary union could become the objective of the third stage of the common market (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) . The Memorandum argued that monetary policy had a "vital importance" for the Common Market, as exchange rate fluctuations could disrupt trade flows. The Memorandum paid special attention to agriculture in this respect. Monetary union was therefore not only a way forward for the Community (Andrews, 2002) . It was considered as necessary to protect the customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy -a "single market" (with common prices) for agricultural products -from exchange rate fluctuations. The
German revaluation of March 1961 had in this respect an important influence on policy-makers at the Commission, as it showed the vulnerability of the international monetary system (Gleske, 2001, p. 147) . For the second stage (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) , the Memorandum proposed "prior consultation" for all important monetary policy decisions, such as changes in the discount rate, minimum reserve ratios, central bank loans to the State, changes in exchange rates, etc 13 .
It is perhaps surprising that such an ambitious programme did not include the European Reserve Fund project of just a few years earlier. However, the "logic" of the Memorandum is rather different from that of the proposal for a European Reserve Fund. The Memorandum started from the common market 12 At the French Planning Office the feeling was that the creation of the common market made planning in France more difficult. See also Benard, 1964. 13 The Commission referred to the 4th annual report of the Monetary Committee, in which it was noted that the currency revaluations of 1961 had "not been preceded by adequate coordination at Community level" (CEC, 1962, p. 37) . The discussions led to adjustments in the Commission proposals. On July 26 1963 the Commission submitted a Recommendation to the Council, concerning the "Medium-Term Economic Policy of the Community" (CEC, 1963b) . In this Recommendation, the Commission first stressed the role of the market as the most effective instrument to ensure the best use of available resources, and the need to maintain and strengthen competition. The Recommendation further argued that the state plays a decisive role in economic life. Therefore a common medium-term economic programme was appropriate. To facilitate the formulation of this programme and to assist the coordination of medium- 14 In a note to Hallstein of 11 September 1962, Meyer, Hallstein's deputy head of cabinet, argued that "The common agricultural policy is today sufficiently firmly rooted that this understanding of its implications for monetary policy could lead to difficulties" (Archives Gleske).
term economic policies, an advisory body, the "Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee", was
proposed. It would provide a stimulus for medium-term analysis at the Commission.
On 24 The Memorandum was very short (two pages) and the proposals were not worked out in detail. They were very much in line with the voluntarist ideas of Triffin and Boyer in DG II 15 . They were also quite in line with French ideas, in favour of a "European monetary identity", but without new supranational institutions (de Lattre, 1999) . However, the Commission proposals were criticised by Germany and the Netherlands, who argued that such a "one-sided monetary approach made no sense" (Szász, 1999, p. 11) . The events of May 1968 and the ensuing crisis over the French franc, in which France invoked the safeguard clauses, further left their imprint.
In October 1968, Raymond Barre was quite sceptical about EMU and defended quite "economiststyle" positions. He declared in the European Parliament that, for EMU to succeed, a European political authority was needed (Barre, 1968, p. 17) . He further argued that monetary union would be the "crowning act" of economic union. Barre went for a pragmatic and two-sided approach, arguing The Memorandum also proposed a system of "early warning" indicators.
c) a Community mechanism for monetary cooperation, to help alleviate pressures on the foreign exchange markets. The proposed Community mechanism for monetary cooperation had to be composed of two parts: one for short-term monetary support and one for medium-term financial assistance.
Compared with the 1962 Action Programme, the Barre Memorandum was clearly much more modest and pragmatic. This is not surprising given the lack of political will, especially -but not only -in the 21.
MMTEC60art.doc At their meeting in March 1969, the Governors stressed that the coordination of economic policies was the most important issue. After a thorough discussion, Ansiaux concluded that a mechanism for monetary cooperation "can be justified more on political than on economic grounds, and from that point of view we cannot be totally negative" (Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the Committee of Governors, 10/3/69, Archives ECB). After further technical monetary discussions, a Community
Mechanism for Short-term Monetary Assistance was created in February 1970.
CONCLUSION
In the mid 1950s, the six countries of the European Coal and Steel Community, followed two rather different paths to economic integration. The six opted for regional integration of the goods markets, with the creation of the EEC. However, monetary integration was approached from a more world-wide perspective, within the framework of the Bretton Woods system. These approaches would largely 
